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stances and argues that we should be attentive to the
creative possibilities of these recent transformations.
stephen c. levinson
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen,
The Netherlands. 16 xi 01
Time in all its manifestations permeates anthropological
writing—unilinear time in studies of change and evo-
lution, cyclical time in studies of the domestic, seasonal,
or mythological cycle, timelessness in studies of tradi-
tion and ancestral presence, and so forth. And the han-
dling of time is one of those great themes that splits
“them” from “us”—the Western world is an empire of
time, a chronometric civilization in which time is reg-
ulated and commoditized in the buying and selling of
labour, usufructs, “futures,” and the like. Benjamin
Franklin’s “Remember that Time is Money” set up a
then-startling equation between the two major cultural
eccentricities which lie at the foundation of our way of
life.
Given all this, there is a curious toothlessness about
time in anthropology, a lack of analytical clarity, an
avoidance (with notable exceptions, of course, as in Gell
1992) of careful descriptive study of the phenomena, and
a reluctance to tackle such a multifaceted range of issues
frontally. In this context, this special issue is very wel-
come. Does it advance our understanding, restore our
analytical dentition? Despite the fact that all of the pa-
pers are interesting in their own ways, I fear we are not
much farther: each paper reminds us of familiar themes,
emergent from particular analytic or ethnographic per-
spectives, without opening up broad new perspectives or
contributing to a larger anthropology of time.
I will comment here on three of the papers that touch
especially on language. Schieffelin focusses on the trans-
formations wrought in Kaluli discourse by the forces of
missionization over the past 30 years. Using rich field
materials gathered over that period, she demonstrates
themes familiar to many fieldworkers—the emergence
of a new cadre of indigenous preachers who castigate the
heathen past, preach the urgency of a Christian future,
and invent new monologic forms of discourse appropri-
ate to those ends. She notes the original mission’s ob-
session with time, reflected in bells, schedules, and ur-
gency for results, and indicates how the language has
changed to accommodate calendrical time. But she fails
to tell us much that we need to know as essential back-
ground—what exactly were the traditional systems of
temporal reckoning, the notions of genealogical and an-
cestral time, and the sources of millenarianism?
Comparing her account with my own experiences of
a Papuan society reveals much traditional lore that
would be of interest here. The inhabitants of Rossel Is-
land speak a language (Ye´lıˆ Dnye) with six diurnal
tenses—effectively coding what happened earlier today,
what yesterday, and what before that in the past and, in
the other direction, what will happen today, tomorrow,
or farther into the future. It is impossible to be vague
about either the past or the future, even imperatives
coming in “now” and “later” forms. This is in fact a
society with some obsession about time. On parting with
someone you must use a formula that expresses on
which day in the future you expect to see the person
again. There are special monolexemic numerals, mean-
ing “the nth day” up to ten, with a generative system
after that. But months, seasons, and years are imprecisely
demarcated cycles because there is no traditional calen-
dric system of any kind—that is, no fixed points to count
from except now, no dating system, and no fixed units
like weeks, months, years. The absence of a calendrical
system must be general to all traditional cultures with-
out cities, courts, or literacy; they are largely motivated
by bureaucratic or religious systems. Still, Rossel people
are obsessed with time.
What drives the Rossel obsession with counting days?
Two things, I think: First, there is a general punctili-
ousness about social relations, motivated in equal mea-
sures by kinship obligations, gerontocracy, and witch-
craft fears. Genealogical time—Rossels routinely reckon
back ten generations—organizes the social world in the
present. The attention to when we will next meet again
is part of a demonstration of acute attention to social
obligations and the anxious respect due to elders and
kinsmen (after all, you may be a witch). A second factor
is the Rossel preoccupation with ceremonial exchanges,
which requires careful planning far into the future so
that song cycles can be rehearsed, food collected, and
massive collections of shell valuables assembled for
exchange on a named day.
Into this traditional system have marched the mis-
sions and the new religions, bearing wholly alien notions
of calendrical time and both cyclical rituals (Sundays,
saints’ days, Easter, anniversaries) and unilinear notions
of development and change. Young men sometimes see
this new temporal system as an avenue to power—1999
saw a revolution of young men preaching the end days,
free love, the overthrow of gerontocratic power, and the
abandonment of agriculture, all in preparation for the
new millennium. The idea that a cycle has a precise start
engenders naturally enough the idea that it might have
a precise end once and for all. Understanding modern
millenarianism requires understanding the temporal
concepts of the traditional society and the revolutionary
implications of calendrical time.
The issue of calendrical systems is nicely taken up by
Ramble in his study of the Te, a Tibeto-Burman enclave
in Nepal. Complex calendrical systems seem generally
to be motivated by ritual cycles (witness the names of
our months), and the West was relatively very late to
develop anything comparable to the Mayan cycles and
their computational power or, indeed, to the Chinese
systems that underlie the Tibetan calendar. Ramble
shows that “a palimpsest of calendars” is available in
Te, and the Tepa express their ethnic identity by holding
onto their own calendar, which is regulated by a simple
count of pebbles. Such a calendar soon gets out of step
with the solar year and is brought back into correspon-
dence with the Tibetan calendar by annual adjustments.
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The concept of cracks between calendars and calendrical
units allows the Tepa to slip out of onerous Tibetan rit-
uals. The end of the year is marked by an exorcism which
Ramble shows is full of anachronisms, and he dwells on
the nature of ritual as objects and events displaced in
space and time (a point also briefly alluded to in Schief-
felin’s paper). There is much observation of interest in
this intelligent essay, but once again we wonder what
has happened to the anthropology of time. Ramble is
interested in the little acts of symbolic independence
from the greater Tibetan and Nepalese world expressed
in a temporal modality, but he does not pursue the mo-
dality itself.
Goodwin takes us to another kind of time—
interactional time, which has a precise chronometric
structure of its own. Conversation unfolds in time, and
each utterance as it unfolds affords opportunities for
other participants to enter or systematically withholds
such opportunities according to a micro-metric of “turn
constructional units” and recognizable actions. Conver-
sation is not regulated by a metronome, however, be-
cause that structural affordance is then exploited by
other parties; coming in before the other has completed
an utterance can demonstrate an exact understanding of
the ideas and actions behind that utterance. Goodwin
takes us through three decades of findings about con-
versational organization and explains how one utterance
can project extensive chunks of talk and even sequences
of conversations—projections of unfolding contingencies
that can be hijacked or contested. He suggests that the
particular syntactic properties of a language, by project-
ing more or less extensive forthcoming structure, may
have implications for a cultural style of interaction. He
also sketches the much larger semiotic field deployed in
interaction—intonation, gesture, reference to objects in
play—and shows how the relative timing of all these
elements is crucial to the building of a verbal interaction.
Though they touch on many interesting issues, none
of these papers really offer us linguistic insights into an
anthropology of time. Rather they show us how temporal
issues play a role in understanding whatever the authors
are concerned with. Although the subject of time, like
other grand Kantian categories, may seem too large to
direct work in any systematic direction, there are surely
important foundations that might be established. Our
Western empire of time now reaches almost every shore
(if only in the form of cheap plastic watches), and the
chances of documenting traditional temporal systems
are fast eroding. One place to start is simply to look at
the linguistic expression of time in the local language.
As I have suggested above in the remarks on the language
of Rossel Island, cultural preoccupations in the temporal
domain are likely to show in the linguistic resources of
a language. The precursors of calendars are the seasonal
and agricultural cycles reflected in the lexicon, you can’t
have a calendar without calendrical terminology, and
systems of tense vary enormously in the temporal dis-
tinctions they make. It has long been noted that the
linguistics of time and space tend to overlap, but this is
itself culturally variable. We have found that languages
use different “frames of reference” or anchoring schema
for spatial distinctions, some cultures, for example, using
cardinal directions almost exclusively (see Levinson
1996 for a review). The study of gesture shows that there
are also gestural homologies between time and space
(see, e.g., Kita, Danziger, and Stolz 2001)—languages
with cardinal direction systems sometimes locating the
past in, for example, a southerly direction and the future
in the north. Sign languages show this homology in sys-
tematic ways (Emmorey 2001). Thus the spatialization
of temporal distinctions can be seen not only in ritual,
as Ramble has noted, but also in unreflective interac-
tional behavior. (A field-manual entry detailing methods
covering these issues can be found at www.mpi.nl.) Al-
though studies of these details may seem a plodding way
to approach an anthropology of time, they are the essen-
tial foundations for a comparative ethnography of tem-
porality which we have as yet failed to establish.
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“Historical particularizing is not inconsistent with sci-
entific generalizing . . . and is moreover performed on
two successive levels: first, in the narrative of true his-
tories; second, in the attempt to make these histories fit
a comprehensive theoretical framework involving ex-
planatory laws” (Bunge 1959:271). The contributors to
this special issue have accomplished what they in-
tended—to provide thought-provoking papers on how an-
thropologists and different groups of people situate
events and processes in time. Gingrich, Ochs, and Swed-
lund state in the introduction that we need to move
“beyond the simplistic dichotomies of subjectivism and
objectivism.” My particular interest is in revealing how
we might create narratives about prehistoric societies. I
have many questions, not because I do not think it pos-
sible to narrate the past but because I think it crucial
that we enliven the past as much as possible. It is im-
portant, however, that we use replicable methods, which
themselves can have different interpretations depending
on the specific interests of prehistorians.
The papers by Bender and Paynter bring to the forefront
the issue of multidimensional and multivocal views of
the material world—ancient, historic, and modern. Both
archaeologists call for more accessible culture histories
that take into account the different backgrounds of au-
dience members to improve the relationship between
various publics and our archaeological discoveries.
Bender accomplishes this by taking into account the var-
ied perceptions about ancient and historic landscapes of
contemporary people as well as the peoples who created
and interacted with the natural and artificial landscapes.
Paynter accomplishes this through narrative culture his-
tories. How information is presented affects how engaged
members of the audience become and what they learn.
The question then becomes how we create knowledge.
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